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 Abstract 
 
An impure public good is a commodity that combines public and private characteristics 
in fixed proportions. Green goods such as dolphin-friendly tuna or green electricity 
programs provide increasingly popular examples of impure public goods. We design an 
experiment to test how the presence of impure public goods affects pro-social behaviour. 
We set parameters, such that from a theoretical point of view the presence of the impure 
public good is behaviourally irrelevant. In a baseline setting, where the impure public 
good provides only small contributions to the public good, we observe that on aggregate 
pro-social behaviour, defined as total contributions to the public good, is lower in the 
presence of the impure good. Some individuals do not alter their decisions, but roughly 
two fifths of subjects make a lower contribution to the public good in the presence of the 
impure public good. On the contrary, in the case where the impure public good favours 
the public good component at the expense of private earnings, individuals are unaffected 
in their behaviour. We conclude that the presence of green goods which have only a small 
environmental component may reduce pro-environmental behaviour.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
So-called green goods involve the joint provision of a private good and an 
environmental public good and are in fact a specific type of impure public good 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1994). In market based societies, many green goods are now 
sold as alternatives to conventional consumer goods in markets as diverse as domestic 
electricity, investment funds, office stationery and cars. More widely, green goods 
belong to the class of embedded goods that include an ethical dimension, such as Fair 
Trade products as well as RED branded goods from Apple, Gap and others. For 
parsimony we will refer to them all as impure goods. In this paper, we report on two 
linked experiments designed to test the impact on choices of the presence of an 
impure good. We seek to examine whether having an impure good available in the 
choice set raises total contributions to a public good. 
The public good characteristic of impure goods may be intrinsic to the production or 
distribution of the private good or it may be simply embedded in the private good, 
such as a donation to a public good cause. The case of the intrinsic public good 
characteristic encompasses goods whose production or distribution process is less 
environmentally damaging as is the case of  green electricity (which is produced with 
renewable energy sources, thus reducing greenhouse-gas emissions), shade-grown 
coffee (whose production preserves the natural habitat and biodiversity), recycled 
stationery (which saves raw resources), dolphin-safe tuna (whose capture process 
minimizes collateral species damage), hybrid cars (which generate less greenhouse-
gas emissions than conventional cars), organic produce (whose production process is 
claimed to be less environmentally damaging than conventional farming), amongst 
others. Meanwhile embedded giving can be found in for example charity postcards 
(which allocate a fixed value of the sales price to the charity), and carbon neutral 
flights (whose price includes the corresponding carbon offset payment). In effect, as 
long as a private good is bundled with a type of environmental offset or contribution 
to reduce environmental externalities, it can be considered an impure good. 
Not only have markets for green and ethical goods emerged recently but there is also 
increased demand for these goods. Furthermore, green goods and eco-labels are 
considered as instruments in an information disclosure approach to environmental 
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policy advocated for example by the OECD (2001)1. Therefore the relevance of 
impure goods in all forms is undeniable.  
Apart from the growing importance of impure goods commercially and in 
environmental policy, our motives for conducting the experiment stems from the fact 
that there at least two main theoretical perspectives on their impact. A straightforward 
view is that impure goods simply add to the choices open to the consumer (Kotchen, 
2005, 2006). One can think of the standard good as being one characteristic and the 
environmental cause as another characteristic. A green good like a carbon neutral 
flight then bundles the standard good and the environmental cause of lower carbon 
emissions into one package. A green good might also lower search costs or reap some 
economies of scope in production. Alternatively, it might be difficult to combine the 
characteristics in the same good. Thus in theory the impure good could offer 
consumption that was more or less efficient than simply purchasing the two goods 
separately. 
 
simply purchasing the two goods separately. 
Alternative perspectives have a psychological element. Consider, for instance, 
anchoring which refers to a non-intentional phenomenon by which final choices and 
judgment are dependent on the initial anchor value as well as to the process of 
adjustment that takes place in between (Kahneman et al., 1986). Ariely et al, 200x, for 
instance show that an anchor provided by the last two digits of an individual’s (US) 
social security number, influence reservation prices in subsequent auctions for real 
goods. Impure goods may provide an anchor, particularly in situations where 
preferences are hazy.  
                                                 
1
 Informational approaches to environmental policy have been called the “third wave” of policy control 
policies, as opposed to the first wave of regulatory instruments and the second wave of 
economic instruments. Tietenberg (1998) considers that «disclosure strategies seek to enlist 
market forces in the quest for efficient pollution control» (p. 588). 
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Another alternative perspective is founded more in social psychology, allied with 
some evidence from recent economics experiments. This view suggests that human 
behaviour is often contextual and wily. Kunda (1990) suggests that individuals use a 
set of cognitive processes that allows them to arrive at the conclusion they want. This 
direction-based reasoning is limited by the justifiability of the reasoning, that is, 
“people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and 
construct a justification of their desired conclusion that could persuade a dispassionate 
observer” (Kunda, 1990, p. 482). This phenomenon of motivated reasoning allows 
individuals to justify their actions and act in the contrary direction prescribed by the 
norm. In the context of public good contributions, individuals may acknowledge a 
norm for altruistic behaviour. However the presence of the impure good may guide 
individuals towards high or low contributions depending on the technology 
parameters. In this sense, an impure good with a low share of the public component 
creates a justification for acting less altruistically than in its absence. 
Motivated reasoning is a fairly neutral term. Other social psychologists have used the 
more loaded expression moral hypocrisy to refer to the case where “morality is 
extolled – even enacted – not with an eye to producing a good and right outcome but 
in order to appear moral yet still benefit oneself” (Batson et al., 1997). This 
phenomenon has been extensively documented with experiments where subjects try to 
give the appearance of acting morally following a pro-social norm, when in reality 
they are acting selfishly (Batson et al., 1997, Batson, 2002).  
Some economic experiments have provided evidence of motivated reasoning effects 
and apparent moral hypocrisy. Both Lazear et al. (2012) and Dana et al. (2006) ran 
dictator games in which subjects had the option not to play the dictator game and keep 
the endowment to themselves without and with a penalty, respectively. In these 
experiments, dictators make their choice before being informed that they can opt out 
of the game and keep the endowment or part of it, and 41% and 27.8% of participants, 
respectively, who had indicated they would have shared something with the recipient, 
then choose to opt out of the game. Therefore, in both cases some subjects who would 
have shared something in a straightforward dictator game, prefer not to play the game 
at all, avoiding thus being in a position where some sort of altruistic norm would 
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compel them to give to the recipient.  
Another source of motivated reasoning occurs in the presence of what Dana et al. (, 
2007) have called a moral wriggle room. A wriggle room is present when some 
element in the decision allows individuals to justify acting selfishly, which implies 
that if the wriggle room was not present, individuals would act more altruistically. 
The wriggle room effect will therefore correspond to a selfish behaviour when the 
wriggle room is present and an altruistic choice otherwise. Several wriggle room 
catalysts have been identified, namely uncertainty about outcomes and delegation of 
responsibility, etc.  
In practice with some actual products, the claims of an impure good are not always 
backed by concrete information concerning the actual contribution to the public good 
cause (as in the case where a percentage of the profits is said to be given to particular 
cause without further information2, 3). In other cases, with goods such as hybrid cars 
which are less environmentally damaging, the consumer needs to seek specialized 
information to fully understand her contribution to the environmental public good. For 
example some Christmas cards are marketed as contributing some amount to a 
selected registered charity. These are often more expensive than equivalent 
conventional Christmas cards and the charitable differential may be less than the 
markup in price4. Hence, a more efficient solution would be to purchase a cheaper 
option and donate the remaining to charity, often without much effort (given the 
                                                 
2
 For example, two Red products have the following indications in terms of the public good component 
(source: http://joinred.com/products/) with no clear monetary quantification: «Giorgio Armani is 
contributing an average of 40 percent of its gross profit margin from sales of all Emporio 
Armani (PRODUCT) RED Products directly to the Global Fund.» and «5-15% (depending on 
the product sold) of the net sales of Converse (PRODUCT) RED shoes will be contributed to the 
Global Fund, to help eliminate AIDS in Africa.» 
3
 The New York Times in December 2007 ran both an editorial and an article on how some embedded 
giving programmes lacked transparency (NYT, 2007a, NYT, 2007b).  
4
 For example, in the UK, the Charities Advisory Board (2007) publishes a list of charity Christmas 
cards and the respective contribution to the designated charity and alerts to the variability in 
charity contributions by retailer and to the small amounts being donated in reality. 
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intensive donation campaigns at that time of year). However, though they are often an 
inefficient option, charity cards are increasingly popular among card purchasers. 
Despite the often blurry definition of the public good component and the inefficiency 
in the implicit technology by which the bundling is achieved, impure goods are 
increasingly chosen in settings where it is also possible to make direct contributions to 
public good causes. Therefore, there are some reasons to suspect that an impure good 
may be chosen because it provides an easy moral escape route from a social norm 
prescribing generosity towards public goods. 
 
To sum up, there are some reasons to suspect that an impure good may be chosen 
because it provides an easy moral escape route from a social norm prescribing 
generosity towards public goods. Alternatively, an impure good that fixes the ratio of 
private to public good expenditure may provide an anchor to individual decisions. 
Given these considerations, we wish to explore the issue of behavioural relevance of 
these impure goods for the private provision of public goods. Therefore, we design an 
experiment where impure goods can be included so as to test their influence on how 
individuals allocate their endowment between the private and public characteristics. 
This type of allocation decision can be studied within a dictator game setting, as we 
will argued. Two related treatments are implemented. Both involve inefficient goods, 
which do not expand the choice set for the consumer, and should thus be 
behaviourally irrelevant. The first treatment corresponds to a within-subject test of the 
behavioural relevance of an impure good that favours the private characteristic (we 
refer to these as selfish impure goods) and equivalently does not impose a high 
contribution to the public good (Treatment SIG). Since selfish impure goods will 
prove to be behaviourally relevant, we need to verify whether this is due to 
experimenter demand or simply anchoring on the impure good allocation. The second 
treatment involves an altruistic impure good, which includes a larger contribution to 
the public good (Treatment AIG). Since the impure good is not behaviourally relevant 
in this case, experimenter demand and anchoring are not likely to explain the 
asymmetric relevance of the impure good, so alternative explanations, such as 
reluctant altruism, are explored. 
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The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
theoretical analysis of impure public goods, and our design. In Sections 3 and 4, we 
present the results. Conclusions from both experiments are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2. IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS AND THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC 
GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1.  PRO-SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND BEHAVIOURS IN THEORY AND 
EXPERIMENTS 
In the Economics literature on pro-social behaviours, several types of preferences 
have been identified that may give rise to the private provision of public goods. 
Generically an altruistic motivation exists when an individual’s utility includes the 
level of public goods. Another such motivation subjacent to the contribution to a 
public good is the warm glow hypothesis of Andreoni (1990), according to which 
some individuals derive utility from the contribution to the public good in itself rather 
than the public good, thus experiencing a “warm-glow” from giving. Alternatively, 
Hollander (1990) considers that individuals care about what is the social standard of 
contribution by others and derive utility from how they compare to this standard. This 
has been denoted as the social approval motivation hypothesis. Furthermore, Brekke, 
Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) consider that individuals care about their own 
perception of their pro-social behaviour relative to others, which is a self-image 
assumption concerning preferences. However, regardless of how we interpret pro-
social behaviour in terms of underlying motivation, in these types of preferences 
individuals derive utility from the private and public characteristics and not from the 
means by which these characteristics are achieved.  
Assuming consumers have preferences towards public goods, the choice problem of 
the pro-socially motivated consumer involves allocating income between private and 
public goods. Impure goods combine both a private and a public dimension with a 
fixed technology, therefore they represent an additional option for the consumer’s 
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choice problem. Within this setting the consumer engages in the private provision of 
public goods when she chooses to purchase either the pure public good or the impure 
good. 
In terms of the Experimental Economics literature, pro-social behaviours have been 
systematically observed in experiments with games such as the dictator game. In 
dictator games, one subject (the dictator) is endowed with money and instructed to 
make a decision as to its division between himself and another participant (the 
recipient). The subject is thus faced with a choice problem involving her payoffs and 
the payoffs of another participant. A robust generic result has been for some dictators 
to allocate a positive share of endowment to recipients, despite that fact that a payoff-
maximizing individual should keep the endowment. However if we assume the 
individual cares about the payoff of the other participant, then sharing a part of the 
endowment may be utility maximizing, and regardless of the motivation prompting 
individuals to share with the recipient, the fact is that these types of behaviours are 
observed robustly in dictator game experiments (Camerer, 2003). The dictator game 
involves no interaction between subjects and is normally a one-shot choice, so there 
are no confounding issues arising from strategic behaviour, reputation building, 
cooperation, etc.  
To study the behavioural reaction of individuals to the presence of impure goods, we 
can take a choice setting, such as a dictator game and replace the other subject by a 
charity, and in this case the subject is asked to allocate the endowment between 
herself and a public good cause. In this choice setting, we can introduce a generic 
impure good, and thus study in a controlled environment whether or not individual 
choices are affected by the presence of the impure good.  
 
2.2. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
Our basic design starts with the theoretical work of Kotchen (2005, 2006) who models 
green goods as impure goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1984, Cornes and Sandler, 1994) 
and uses a broad definition of green good to include both cases discussed above, 
namely the intrinsic and embedded public characteristic. Kotchen proposes that 
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consumer behaviour and the private provision of public goods in markets with impure 
goods be analyzed within a characteristics approach. Specifically, preferences are 
based on the consumption of private and the public characteristic regardless of how 
they are achieved (through pure private, pure public or impure goods). For want of a 
better term, we will call this the standard view. 
The budget constraint faced by the consumer is represented by a combination of 
private characteristics iX  and public characteristics Y, which can be obtained via a 
conventional good ( ic ) generating one unit of X and costing 1 monetary unit, a direct 
donation to the public good ( id ) generating one unit of Y and costing 1 monetary unit, 
or via the impure good ( ig ). The impure good generates both characteristics i iX gα=  
and i iY gβ=  with positive technology parameters5 ( 0, 0α β> > ) and costs 1. The prices 
of the characteristics are mainly a function of technology parameters, when obtained 
via the impure good. An impure good, whose joint production of the characteristics is 
more efficient than the separate production, i.e. 1α β+ > , will be denoted as efficient, 
as opposed to the case where 1α β+ <  and 1α β+ = , which will be called inefficient 
and neutral impure good respectively.  
The budget constraint faced by a consumer i in the presence of an efficient impure 
good with exogenous wealth of wi is defined in terms of the characteristics by 
equations (0.1) and illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
( )
1
1
 
i i i
i i i
Y w X
Y w X
β
α
β
α
≤ −
−
−≤ −
 (0.1) 
 
                                                 
5
 Kotchen (2005) suggests that the technology parameter related to the public good characteristic can be 
interpreted as an awareness parameter related to how consumers perceive this component of the 
impure public good. 
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Figure 1 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with efficient impure good (E) 
In the presence of the efficient impure good, the set of possible characteristics bundles 
is expanded in comparison with just the combination of ci and di. Point M corresponds 
to the case where individuals allocate all their income to the consumption of Xi 
through the consumption of conventional private good ci. To increase the 
consumption of Yi, without the impure good, individuals trade-off one for one 
consumption of ci for di. With the impure good, they can increase consumption of Yi, 
by reducing ci  and increasing gi, thus moving up segment EM. This occurs up to the 
limit where all income is being allocated to the impure good yielding βwi of Yi and 
αwi of Xi. B corresponds to the case where individuals allocate all income to the 
public good thus generating Yi=wi. To increase consumption of Xi individuals can 
move down segment BE, decreasing donation and increasing consumption of the 
impure good, up to bundle E. So, an impure good whose production technology is 
efficient expands the individual consumption possibilities set. 
Given these budget constraints (in equations (0.1)) and assuming that individuals’ 
preferences are defined only on the characteristics space, the individual utility 
maximization problem over the characteristics is as follows: 
 
( )
( )
,
,
. .  
1
1
       
i i
i i iX Y
i i i
i i i
maxU X Y
s t Y w X
Y w X
β
α
β
α
≤ −
−
−≤ −
 (0.2) 
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For the case when the impure good is neutral in terms of its technology ( 1α β+ = ), the 
same bundle of characteristics is obtainable with a combination of private and public 
goods. In Figure 2, the consumption set is given by segment BM only. The 
introduction of this impure good is neutral as far as the consumer optimization 
problem is concerned, since individual preferences are only defined on the 
characteristics. If an impure good is inefficient and has a technology such that 
1α β+ < , it would be possible to spend the same amount of income on a combination 
of the conventional private and public goods and obtain higher amounts of at least one 
characteristic. This is illustrated by Figure 3. When the impure goods are either 
neutral or inefficient, the consumer utility maximization problem implies that the 
choice of the impure good is always weakly or strongly dominated, since the 
consumer will always prefer more of each characteristic rather than less. In both 
cases, when consumer’s preferences are defined in terms of private and public 
characteristics, the introduction of an impure good should not alter the allocation to 
the consumption of private and public characteristics. 
 
  
Xi
Yi
wi
wi
E
αwi
βwi
B
M
 
Figure 2 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with neutral impure good 
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Figure 3 Budget frontiers in the characteristics space with inefficient impure good 
In summary, when we assume that individuals’ preferences are defined in terms of 
private and public characteristics, the introduction of an inefficient or neutral impure 
good does not affect individual’s utility maximization problem and therefore does not 
affect her utility maximizing choices. The purpose of this paper is to investigate 
whether this theoretical prediction holds experimentally; in other words, we should 
still find experimentally that as long as the impure good is not efficient it should be 
behaviourally irrelevant. 
 
 
2.3. IMPURE GOODS IN A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
So, from a standard point of view, the introduction of an impure good is just another 
way of supplying private and public characteristics. If the impure good is efficient, it 
will expand the consumption possibilities. However if this impure good is neutral or 
inefficient it does not alter the consumption set and therefore the ultimate utility 
maximizing choices. Therefore our main hypothesis is: 
H0: The presence of an inefficient or neutral impure good is not behaviourally 
relevant. 
A corollary is that the impure good should not be chosen when it is inefficient. 
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To test this hypothesis we use a modified dictator game as the starting point. In the 
typical dictator game, the recipient is another individual, usually another player in the 
experiment. We use a good cause as the recipient (see for example Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) who use a local branch of the American Red Cross as a recipient). 
In the baseline decision, individuals can keep the endowment for private purposes or 
make contributions to public good causes. In the treatment decisions, the impure good 
is an option with a predefined division of the payoffs between the individual and the 
charity. When an impure good is present we will refer to this modified game as an 
impure good dictator game. 
Subjects are asked to allocate a given endowment of 10 tokens between themselves 
and a charity, which is described before the start of the experiment. For this 
experiment, the charity is the Hardship Fund at Royal Holloway – University of 
London, UK (RHUL) which assists students financially. We choose this charity to 
make it relevant to the participants in the experiment, since for the charitable 
component of the experiment to be salient, subjects should care about it and being 
students at RHUL, we expect them to feel more strongly towards this charity than 
another broader charity. Therefore their earnings from this experiment correspond to a 
private consumption decision and their donation to the charity corresponds to their 
private provision of the public good (in this case, the welfare of fellow students at 
RHUL). 
 
2.4. DESIGN 
Given a fixed endowment, the underlying budget set can be described by four 
parameters: 
1. The presence or absence of the impure public good. 
2. The value of α+β – i.e. whether the impure public good is neutral, efficient or 
inefficient. 
3. The value of β/α – i.e. whether the impure public good has relatively more or 
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less of the public good. 
4. The price, p, of the public good, relative to the private good.  
In the experiment we vary the values of these parameters to consider the robustness of 
the main hypothesis and to investigate subsidiary theories. We two values of p: when 
the price of making a donation is high, one token kept corresponds to £0.50 in 
individual earnings and one token allocated to the charity corresponds to a donation of 
£1; when the price of making a donation is low, one token kept still corresponds to 
£0.5, but now £2 goes to the charity for each token donated to it. We use two types of 
β/α. For simplicity we will label impure public goods with the relatively high value of 
β/α as altruistic and ones with a relatively low value of β/α as selfish. Obviously these 
labels are purely relative. Finally, this experiment concerns only impure goods where 
the technology parameters are such that they are not efficient (α+β≤1). 
For the baseline decision (labeled 1H), we use the high price. The budget frontier is 
illustrated in Figure 4 (a). The range of potential private earnings is [£0, £5] for the 
individual and [£0, £10] for the charity. 
In the treatment decision (Decision 2H), individuals have not only the option to make 
an allocation of 10 tokens as described above, but also the option to choose a 
predefined allocation, corresponding to an inefficient and selfish impure good. The 
inefficient impure good implies earnings of £4.25 for the individual and £0.50 for the 
charity, corresponding to 8.5 tokens and 0.5 tokens respectively (illustrated in Figure 
4 (b)).  
In a variant of the treatment decision, the selfish impure good is neutral in its 
characteristics combination (Decision 3H). This impure good implies private earnings 
of £4 and donation of £2. The choice set is illustrated in Figure 4 (c). 
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Figure 4 Choice set in baseline decision and decisions with selfish impure goods with high price of 
giving 
 
Other decisions can be depicted in a similar manner, as in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 Choice set in baseline decision and decision with inefficient impure good with low price of 
giving 
 
Subjects are also told they will have to make several decisions but only one will count 
towards their actual payoff and charity donations, which will be determined by 
random draw at the end. This procedure follows the random-selection method (Davis 
and Holt, 1993, p. 438) with neither feedback between decisions nor feedback in 
terms of what other participants have chosen. As such, subjects have an incentive to 
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treat each decision independently, and are reminded more than once that they should 
treat each decision as if it were the one that will determine their actual payoff. 
 
3. EXPERIMENT 1: SELFISH IMPURE GOOD 
3.1. IMPLEMENTATION 
Subjects were recruited at RHUL by campus and intranet advertisements and via the 
mailing list for recruitment to economic experiments. The sessions took place in the 
Experimental Economics Laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) during the 
month of October 2007. Subjects were seated at computer terminals and informed that 
their decisions and earnings would remain anonymous and private. In this experiment, 
66 students took part, of which 23 were female (35%) and the average age was 20.9 
years.  
To familiarize subjects with the computer interface and ultimately the allocation 
calculations that are later required of them, individuals are asked to read through a 
hypothetical scenario where allocation decisions are made and asked to make 
calculations. There is however a clear indication that this is not the actual 
experimental scenario. In case a participant makes a mistake, she has to wait for the 
experimenter to discuss the error privately before she can proceed to the actual 
experiment. Of the 66 participants who took part in the experiment reported here, 9 
required intervention by the experimenter. However, there were no significant 
differences in the distribution of behaviour in any decision between subjects who 
made a mistake in the practice and those who did not.  
For a session that never exceeded one hour, average earnings were £8.14, with a 
minimum earned of £5.40 and a maximum of £9, which include a show-up fee of £4. 
This is comfortably above the minimum hourly wage for the UK. 
 
3.2. RESULTS 
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Order effects 
We implement two treatments, each with 12 decisions, which differ in the order with 
which the baseline decision (Decision 1H) and the decision with impure good 
(Decision 2H) are implemented as well as in the order of other decisions. In order 
treatment 1, the first decision is the baseline decision (with high cost of giving) 
followed by the decision with an impure good (with high cost of giving), and the 
reverse is implemented in order treatment 2. Respectively, 29 and 37 subjects 
participate in each order treatment. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test 
(WMW test) yields no statistically significant differences in donations in the baseline 
decision in both treatments (test statistic of z=-0.669 and 2-tailed p-value = 0.504). 
Meanwhile, the difference in charitable behaviour in the presence of the impure good 
in both order treatments is not statistically significant, following the WMW test 
(z=0.013, 2-sided p=0.985). Similarly there are no order treatment differences for the 
other decisions made by subjects in this experiment. Hence, the data for each decision 
is pooled for the following analyses. 
 
Behaviour in the baseline decision  
In our experiment, in the baseline decision with high price of giving (Decision 1H), 
77% of subjects donate a positive amount to charity, as can be seen in Figure 6. On 
average the amount donated is £2.42 which corresponds to 24.2% of the maximum 
donation possible (Table 1 summarizes the donations for this decision and for the 
decisions that will be discussed later). Also, considering only the donors, the average 
donation is 31.3% of the maximum allowed. 
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Figure 6 Frequency of donations in Decision 1H 
Table 1 Donations in Experiment 1: descriptive statistics 
Mean
Standard 
deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Baseline Decision Decision 1H 2.42 2.33 2 0 10
Decision with inefficient selfish impure good Decision 2H 1.67 1.86 1 0 9
Decision with neutral selfish impure good Decision 3H 1.89 1.56 2 0 10
Baseline Decision Decision 1L 5.30 5.78 4 0 20
Decision with inefficient selfish impure good Decision 2L 2.77 3.99 2 0 20
Note: 66 observations
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The results are in line with previous work. Lazear et al. (2012) observe in their 
baseline treatment (with anonymity) that 67% of the 46 participants share something 
with the recipient of the $10 with which they are endowed; on average subjects share 
24.2% of the endowment and considering only the individuals who share something, 
the average shared is 37.1%. Meanwhile, Eckel and Grossman (1996) observe that 
73% of subjects donate to the charity.  
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Behaviour in the presence of a selfish and inefficient impure good 
In Decision 2H, the impure good gives an earning of £4.25 to the individual and £0.50 
to the charity. In this decision the impure good can be classified as both selfish, since 
the implicit token allocation favours the individual, and inefficient, since it generates 
a loss of 1 token, or equivalently £0.50 in private earnings or £1 in donation 
The null hypothesis is that the impure good is not behaviourally relevant. However, 
comparing individual charitable behaviour in the presence and absence of the impure 
good, we reject this hypothesis. In the baseline decision, 1H, mean donations are 
£2.42; in decision 2H, in the presence of the selfish and inefficient impure good the 
mean donation is £1.67 (refer to Table 1 and Figure 7 for the frequency of donations). 
The mean donation is lower because 42.5% of subjects (28) donate less to the charity 
in the presence of the impure good, whereas only 21% (14) increase their 
contribution. Comparing donation choices in Decision 1H and 2H, we conclude that 
this behavioural difference is statistically significant (z=2.65, p<0.01) 6.  
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Figure 7 Frequency of donations in Decision 2H 
                                                 
6
 Unless otherwise stated, the reported p-values for the statistical tests are 1-tailed p-values and the 
reported test results are for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (W test). 
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We also observe that the impure good is chosen by 9 out of 66 subjects (13.6%) in 
Decision 2H. This behaviour is not consistent with assuming that individuals care 
only about the private or public characteristics. A closer inspection of the individuals 
who choose the impure good reveals that 7/9 give a higher donation in the baseline 
decision.  
If we restrict attention to the individuals who do not choose the impure good (57 
subjects), the mean donation is £2.29 in Decision 1H and £1.85 in Decision 2H. For 
this subsample, the charitable behaviour is significantly higher in Decision 1H than in 
Decision 2H following the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (z=1.747, 
p=0.04). In other words donations are typically lower in the presence of the impure 
good. 
 
With a low price of giving we get the same difference between tasks. A breakdown of 
the frequency of donations is presented in Figure 9. Decision 1L is the same as the 
baseline decision but with a low price of donating. In Decision 1L the 66 participants 
donate on average 2.65 tokens, corresponding to £5.30, and specifically 53 (80%) are 
donors (Figure 8), donating 3.30 tokens or equivalently £6.60.  Similarly decision 2L 
is the same as 2H but for the lower price of giving. Again donations are lower in the 
presence of the impure good. The mean donation is only £2.77 in 2L. Median 
behaviour is significantly higher in Decision 1L than in Decision 2L (z=4.37, p<0.01). 
Meanwhile in 2L, the impure good is chosen by 22.7% (15/66) subjects.  Considering 
only the 51 individuals who do not choose the impure good in Decision 2L, the same 
behavioural effect from the presence of the impure good is observed relative to 
Decision 1L. The mean donation is lower (£4.66 to £3.29) and the behavioural 
difference between median decisions is statistically significant (z=3.093, p<0.01). 
 
As an aside we can examine the effect of lowering the price of donations by 
comparing behaviour in 1L and 1H. In terms of tokens donated there are no 
statistically significant differences in individual decisions (z=-0.143, 2–tailed p=0.88), 
whereas, as a consequence, the difference in monetary donations is statistically 
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significant between decisions (z = -4.232 and p<0.01). Therefore, subjects do not 
change their own earnings as a consequence of the decrease in the price of giving, 
however they are able to become more generous without sacrificing any personal 
gain. These results are in line with the findings of Karlan and List (2007) who find 
that an increase in matching has no significant effect on the amount directly donated 
(before matching) by individuals.  
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Figure 8 Frequency of donations in Decision 1L 
To sum up, both the hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of the inefficient impure 
good and the corollary of no-choice of inefficient impure goods are rejected. Not only 
do some subjects choose the inefficient impure good and decrease their donation as a 
consequence, but the ones who make an explicit allocation, give a lower average 
contribution to the charity in the impure good dictator game. 
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Figure 9 Frequency of donations in Decision 2L 
 
3.3. SELFISH AND NEUTRAL IMPURE GOOD 
We include in the tasks a variation on Decision 2H, which consists of making the 
impure good neutral instead of inefficient (Decision 3H). Again the standard 
theoretical prediction for individuals who care only about the private and public 
characteristics is for their charitable behaviour not to be influenced by the presence of 
the neutral impure good. In terms of implementation, this decision consists of the 
choice set representation in Figure 4 (c), where the impure good has a payoff of £4 for 
the individual and £2 for charity, which is equivalent to 8 tokens kept and 2 donated.  
In this decision, the mean donation is £1.89 as opposed to £2.42 in the baseline 
decision (Decision 1H). Comparing these two decisions, charitable behaviour in the 
baseline is higher with weak statistical significance (z=1.607, p=0.054), which again 
corroborates the finding of behavioural relevance of a non-efficient impure good. 
Also, 26 out of the 66 participants (39.4%) choose the neutral impure good, but for 
these individuals we observe no significant behavioural change relative to the baseline 
decision (z=0.89, 2-tailed p=0.372). On the contrary, the subjects who make the 
allocation in Decision 3H decrease their mean donation from £2.3 in the baseline to 
£1.82 and the median donation pattern is weakly significantly higher in the baseline 
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relative to Decision 3H (z=1.402, p=0.08). Furthermore, whereas the inefficient 
impure good is only chosen by 13.6% (9/66) of subjects, the neutral good is picked by 
39.4% (26/66), even though out of these 26 subjects, only 6 donate the same £2 in 
Decision 1H that they are implicitly donating in Decision 3H through the impure 
good. 
Given that we observe the same type of donation decrease in the presence of either an 
inefficient or a neutral selfish impure good, it is interesting to further investigate if 
there is any further change in generosity when the good is neutral relative to when it is 
inefficient. For this purpose we can compare behaviour in Decision 3H involving a 
neutral impure good and Decision 2H involving an inefficient impure good. 
Charitable behaviour in the presence of the former is weakly significantly higher than 
in the presence of the latter (z=1.5, p=0.065). It can be the case that overall subjects 
become more generous towards the charity or that the inefficiency is in fact being 
passed on to the charity. In fact we observe that whereas donations are lower relative 
to the baseline, private payoffs are similar to the baseline (z=0.99, 2-tailed p=0.321), 
so the slight increase in donations comes from the fact that the impure good is no 
longer inefficient. Also, the result is mostly driven by the behaviour of the individuals 
who choose the neutral impure good, since the remaining 40 subjects do not 
significantly alter their donations between Decision 2H and 3H (z=0.332, 2-tailed 
p=0.7395), but decrease them relative to Decision 1H (z=-1.402, p=0.08). Therefore 
even though we observe an overall increase in donations when the impure good loses 
its inefficiency, this is not driven by a behavioural change by those who are making 
the active allocations but by the fact that the good is neutral. 
In summary, relative to the baseline decision, the introduction of the neutral selfish 
impure good decreases charitable behaviour, mostly because subjects not choosing the 
impure good decrease their donation. On the contrary, those individuals who pick the 
neutral impure good remain on aggregate consistent in their donation behaviour 
relative to the baseline. Also, when the impure good is neutral donation behaviour is 
slightly higher than when it is inefficient, since the inefficiency in the impure good is 
being brunt by the charity. 
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3.4. ANCHORING OR EXPERIMENTER DEMAND 
This experiment extends the dictator game to include the option of a transparent 
impure good. Even though, we would expect selfish impure goods, either neutral or 
inefficient to be behaviourally irrelevant, we have rejected both the behavioural 
irrelevance hypothesis and its corollary of no-choice of the inefficient impure good.  
One possible explanation for this behavioural relevance of the impure good may be 
due to a cognitive process of anchoring and/or experimenter demand.7 Anchoring 
refers to a non-intentional phenomenon by which final choices and judgment are 
dependent on the initial anchor value as well as to the process of adjustment that takes 
place in between (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  Since the impure good in this 
experimental setting provides a defined allocation of tokens and earnings, this may 
provide some anchoring bias in the individual decisions in the presence of the impure 
good, especially given the consecutive nature of the decisions, even if within a 
random lottery of decisions for payoff determination. Alternatively, decisions may be 
driven by experimenter demand, whereby subjects try to comply with what they see as 
the wishes of the experimenter.  
Since anchoring is typically defined as a non-motivated phenomenon, if it is present it 
should occur in an experiment setting such as this one regardless of the nature of the 
impure good. We therefore run a second experiment with an altruistic impure good, 
designed to test the following null hypothesis: 
H0:  The presence of an inefficient or neutral impure good is not behaviourally 
relevant when the impure good is altruistic. 
If we reject this null, then anchoring or experimenter demand appears to be a likely 
explanation of our results. Alternatively, if we accept the null then we reject 
anchoring and experimenter demand explanations of behaviour in Experiment 1.  
                                                 
7
 The wider significance of our results would differ between these explanations. If impure goods caused 
an anchoring effect, their presence could lower or raise pro-social behaviour depending on the 
value of the anchor. If on the other hand are results were driven by experimenter demand then 
they would have no obvious policy implications.  
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4. EXPERIMENT 2: ALTRUISTIC IMPURE GOOD 
4.1. DESIGN 
This experiment is similar to Experiment 1, except for the fact that in the treatment 
decision, the impure good favours the charity rather than the individual. From the 
standard theoretical point of view the null hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of the 
inefficient impure good should hold. Individuals are faced with 9 decisions and 
informed that only one of these decisions will be randomly picked at the end to 
determine their payoff from the experiment. The focus of this experiment is to study 
the effect of an altruistic impure good in a similar setting to Experiment 1. Therefore 
the first two decisions correspond to the baseline decision and the treatment decision. 
In the baseline decision, participants can allocate 10 tokens between themselves and 
the charity. The price of donating is low, which means that every 1 token the 
individual donates, corresponds to £2. Since each token is worth £0.50 in private 
earnings, this low price of giving is equivalent to a matching ratio of £1: £3. The 
choice set in this decision is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 10. The treatment impure 
good is altruistic because it favours the charity in terms of the allocation (Decision 
4L). In this case the individual earns £2 and the charity receives £11, which 
corresponds to 4 tokens kept and 5.5 donated, so this impure good is inefficient. 
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Figure 10 Choice set in baseline decision and decision with altruistic impure good with low price of 
giving 
 
4.2. RESULTS 
Subjects were again recruited at Royal Holloway – University of London during 
December 2007. In this experiment, 33 individuals participated, of which 16 were 
female (48%) and the average age was 21.3 years. In the baseline decision, 78.7% of 
subjects donate a positive amount to charity (28/33), and the mean donation is £4.90 
for the whole sample and £6.23 for donors only. The donation choices are illustrated 
in Figure 11 and descriptive statistics are in Table 2. 
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Figure 11 Frequency of donations in baseline decision in Experiment 2 
 
Table 2 Donations in Experiment 2: descriptive statistics 
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Mean
Standard 
deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Baseline Decision Decision 1L 4.90 5.07 4 0 20
Decision with inefficient altruistic impure good Decision 4L 5.54 5.67 4 0 20
Note: 33 observations
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In the presence of the impure good (decision 4L), the mean donation is £5.54 and 
72.7% of subjects donate something to charity (24/33). The impure good is chosen by 
5 out of the 33 participants (15.2%). Experiment 1 established that participants 
decreased their donations in the presence of the selfish impure good. But for these two 
decisions in Experiment 2, there is no statistically significant behavioural difference 
(z=-0.981, 2-tailed p-value=0.326).  
Therefore, the hypothesis of behavioural irrelevance of an altruistic and inefficient 
impure good is not rejected. As such, if the results in Experiment 1 had been driven 
by either anchoring or experimenter demand we would expect a similar influence of 
this more altruistic impure good, generating more generous behaviours. However, as 
observed the altruistic cue is ignored by subjects. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
From a standard point of view the presence of an impure good that is not efficient 
should not affect individual charitable behaviour. Our experiments introduce 
inefficient and neutral impure goods in a choice setting and test the behavioural 
irrelevance hypothesis in a laboratory environment.  
Experiment 1 introduced an impure good that favoured the individual in terms of 
earnings. As shown, the presence of the selfish impure good decreases individual 
charitable behaviour (Decision 2H). On the one hand, individuals who were donating 
more money to charity decrease their donation; specifically 31.8% (21/66) of 
participants make active allocations that imply a lower donation in the presence of the 
impure good. On the other hand, we saw that 13.6% (9/66) of subjects opt for the 
impure good despite its inefficiency and thereby 7 are in fact being less generous than 
before. These individuals who choose the impure good are in a sense opting out of the 
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dictator game before them and taking a convenient solution, for which they are 
willing to sacrifice some donations. Given that the impure good is inefficient, while 
many subjects were influenced, most did not choose it, which does not mean, as we 
showed, that they were not impacted by the presence of the impure good. 
Maintaining the inefficiency of the impure good, Experiment 2 tests the behavioural 
irrelevance hypothesis but with an impure good that favours the charity. In this case, 
the impure good did not generate statistically significant behavioural changes. 
Therefore what we observe in Experiment 1 does not seem to be the result of 
experimenter demand or, a mostly unconscious phenomenon such as anchoring8, since 
we would expect similar results in Experiment 2 if this were the case. 
It seems the presence of the impure good actually plays a role in the decisions, even 
when it is inefficient. However its role is asymmetric since it becomes relevant when 
it favours the individual but irrelevant when the charitable component is more 
important. We see that when a selfish impure good is present, either neutral or 
inefficient, it is chosen by some individuals. Even when the impure good is not 
chosen, the amount donated to the charity is lower in comparison with the decisions 
where it was not present. 
Green goods are becoming increasingly available in markets for private goods. When 
the technology is efficient, their presence actually expands the choice set of 
individuals and may have a positive effect on the private provision of environmental 
public characteristics in equilibrium. However, in reality not all green good 
technologies are more efficient than the simple combination of consumption of private 
goods and donations to charity, and yet consumers still demand green goods. 
Therefore, despite the appeal that green and ethical goods may have for a 
decentralized private provision of public goods, we wonder if impure goods foster or 
discourage pro-environmental or pro-social behaviours.  
                                                 
8
 Anchoring may still be driving the results in Experiment 1 since we cannot be sure how individuals 
are being influenced by the cue implied by the impure public good allocation. However, 
individuals only seem to be influenced by an eventual anchor when it is in their self-interest to 
do so, so if we assume anchoring is not self-serving, it should be present in both Experiments. 
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As our experiment reveals, the introduction of a selfish impure good, either neutral or 
inefficient, is behaviourally relevant, not only because it alters median behaviours, but 
also because the impure good is chosen despite its inefficiency or neutrality. In sum, 
for a non-negligible part of the sample their pro-social behaviours in the presence of 
the impure goods are not consistent with pro-social motivations as normally 
interpreted, for example assuming altruistic motivations. From a theoretical point of 
view if individuals are assumed to have pro-social motivations and derive utility from 
a public good, they should care about the level of the public good regardless of 
whether it is achieved via a donation to a charitable cause or via an impure good. 
However, in our experiment some individuals decrease their donations, choose 
inefficient and selfish options, despite the private and public characteristics being 
transparent in all decisions. Thus individuals appear to care about more than the two 
characteristics. 
Authors such as Lazear et al. (2012), Dana et al. (2006) and Dana et al. (2007) have 
recently hypothesized that part of the altruistic behaviour previously observed in 
economic experiments may in fact be some sort of reluctant altruism, i.e. were these 
individuals to be given the possibility to “get away” with not being altruistic they 
would seize it. Given the conclusions of our experiment, the selfish impure good 
seems to be acting as an option to opt-out of the dictator game or providing leeway for 
a motivated reasoning process by which individual choose to behave less altruistically 
than in the absence of the impure good. Therefore in the absence of these impure 
goods, choices are transparent and there is no room to wriggle, so individuals who 
acknowledge an altruistic norm are more generous. Introducing a selfish impure good 
provides wriggle room and decreases pro-social behaviours. In the case of green 
goods, though their emergence appears appealing for the private provision of 
environmental public goods, they may ultimately decrease pro-environmental 
behaviours. 
 In summary, the results from our experiments add to the growing literature on 
contextual effects in experiments on pro-social behaviour, where altruistic behaviours 
become less prevalent than in previous experiments and more context-dependent. On 
the other hand, our experiments provide an approach to studying the impact of impure 
goods on pro-social behaviours and by generating somewhat unexpected results create 
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room for future explorations of this topic. 
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